One danger facing religion-beat veterans is that a broad trend becomes so familiar we overlook its continuing journalistic importance. One example is the year-by-year-by-year decline of America’s once-influential “Mainline” Protestant churches over the past half-century, even as conservative or “Evangelical” Protestants generally kept up with population growth — until recently.
(For additional background, please note that the June 24 Guy Memo lamented media neglect of Mainline angles in spot news coverage. See also this recent Ryan Burge post.)
The Mainline shrinkage is one of this era’s momentous changes in American religion, great a void in the public square into which evangelicals moved. Others major trends include the substantial rise of unaffiliated “nones,” immigration-driven increases in Hispanic Catholics and followers of Asian religions, and white Catholics’ shift from loyal Democrats to pivotal Republican constituency.
It’s big stuff if that Mainline Protestant slide has bottomed out or that’s any kind of upswing. And what if Mainliners now suddenly outnumber the rival white Evangelicals (leaving aside the distinctive Black and Hispanic Evangelicals). Such is the scenario in a major new survey released July 8 by the Public Religion Research Institute (contacts at press@prri.org or 202-238-9424).
PRRI tells us that white Mainliners are now 16.4% of the U.S. population, a remarkable gain from 13% as recently as 2016, while white Evangelicals have fallen to 14.5% from a 23% peak in 2006. White Catholics constitute a pretty stable 11.7%.
Politically, Mainliners are divided and thus have less clout than other groups, identifying as 35% Democrats, 33% Republicans, and 30% Independents.
As journalists ponder what to make of this surprising report, begin with what’s “Mainline” in the church marketplace. The Guy (and others) say the word designates those Protestant denominations — the so-called “Seven Sisters” — born in Colonial America or the early Republic, with predominantly white memberships, that are affiliated with the National Council of Churches and are tolerant or favorable toward liberal belief. We could add that the well-educated Mainliners typically enjoy relatively high incomes and social status.
Here is the key: This PRRI survey at hand identified Mainliners by what they are not instead of what they are.
The 50,334 bilingual interviews (a huge sample with minuscule margin of error) conducted throughout 2020 asked, “Would you describe yourself as a ‘born again’ or ‘evangelical Christian,’ or not?” Non-Hispanic white Protestants who said no were labeled Mainline. The Guy would observe that “born again” can miss Evangelicals raised in the faith who never experienced a specific moment of conversion or Evangelicals who think of themselves under other labels.
Pew Research Center surveys often categorize respondents as either Evangelical or Mainline based on specific local affiliations according to an elaborate listing of church groups. This method provides precise and useful religious data though it might miss Evangelicals in Mainline churches. In contrast with PRRI, Pew’s count of 2020 registered voters was 18% white Evangelicals (down from 21% in 2008, 13% white non-Evangelical Protestants (down from 19%) and 12% white Catholics (down from 17%).
Some might wonder if PRRI’s liberal cast slanted its results. After all, founder and C.E.O. Robert P. Jones is the author of “White Too Long: The Legacy of White Supremacy in American Christianity.” PRRI’s survey provided ammo for Michelle Goldberg, a liberal weather-vane columnist with The New York Times, who pretty much identifies evangelicalism as white nationalism and remains “frightened” by the “religious right” even if it’s supposedly declining.
Seems to The Guy PRRI’s numbers do not lie.
But. The media should understand that this survey catches popular moods and how people identify in socio-political terms as much as by religious belief and practice.
More important, perhaps, are membership reports from Mainline churches themselves. The Guy admits he was stunned by the results in comparing their latest statistics with those filed around 1970 for the Yearbook of American Churches (whose 2012 demise as a National Council of Churches project itself signaled Mainline torpor). It’s hard for the Mainline flock to trend up while it’s churches are fading. Check out this sobering chart from Ryan Burge.
I put together a really simple linear model to project what American religion will look like in the next decade.
The results indicate that the “nones” will unequivocally be the largest group in America in 2029, and that’s largely a result of more mainline decline (10.8%->4.4%). https://t.co/NF6PbrEAMR
— Ryan Burge 📊 (@ryanburge) October 24, 2019
Take the seven largest Mainline denominations (including certain predecessor bodies): American Baptist Churches, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Episcopal Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Presbyterian Church (USA), United Church of Christ, and United Methodist Church (the latter currently on the brink of schism over the Bible and sexuality).
These seven began the 1970s with “inclusive” memberships totaling 28.5 million and have ended up with 13.3 million, a 53% plummet. The Disciples are down 73%, with little media awareness because congregational government meant folks quietly walked away without political fireworks. Close behind were the Presbyterians, down 69%, in part due to three well-publicized schisms. American Baptists were down only 8%. The other four groups’ declines ranged from 39% to 59%.
That degree of decline is without historical precedent, so a turnabout could be the story of the decade. But religion writers are well advised to carefully and warily assess what’s going on. Meanwhile, the reasons for the historic Mainline disaster should remain high on the journalistic agenda. For example, if the Mainline churches got too political does that say something to current Evangelical activists?
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